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THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION:
THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
STEPHANIE RIVERA BERRUZ

ABSTRACT: Latin American philosophy has long been concerned with its philosophical
identity. In this paper I argue that the search for Latin American philosophical identity is
motivated by a desire for recognition that largely hinges on its relationship to European
thought. Given that motivations are seldom easily accessible, the essay comparatively draws
on Africana and Native American metaphilosophical reflections. Such juxtapositions serve as
a means of establishing how philosophical exclusions have themselves motivated and
structured how Latin American philosophy has understood its own quest for philosophical
identity. In closing, I gesture toward the possibilities of shifting the conversation away from
what makes Latin American philosophy distinct toward one of praxis—what do we want Latin
American philosophy to do.
Keywords: Africana philosophy, Latin American philosophy, metaphilosophy, Native
American philosophy, recognition, rationality

1. INTRODUCTION
Latin American philosophers have been deeply concerned with the status of Latin
American philosophy; a concern phrased in the question: Does there exist a distinct
Latin American philosophy? The question has garnered substantial attention, and
philosophers and historians alike have heeded the call to respond. The responses
largely engage the criteria by which to identify Latin American philosophy or take
grave concern with the possibilities of its existence as an appropriate philosophical
field. Although discussion about the search for philosophical identity have been
ample, the motivations that structure the conversation are not always the focal point
of discussion, a space where I contend some of the most fruitful analysis is found as
Latin American philosophy continues to solidify as a field of study.
Latin American philosophy’s search for philosophical identity has been foiled by
a justificatory project. If Latin American philosophy exists, then it must be shown
through the use of standards that are themselves already set up to duplicate conditions
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of exclusion. The exclusions of philosophy stem from its very own racialized
intellectual frameworks, which can not necessarily be appreciated from the confines
of the Latin American metaphilosphical conversation itself. The exclusionary
heirlooms and practices of philosophy can be made visible through a number of
measures, but in the context of this essay I want to suggest a comparative gesture by
juxtaposing Africana and Native American philosophy with Latin American
philosophy on the question of philosophical identity. The comparative gesture is
important for a number of reasons. First, Africana philosophy has deeply explored the
conditions by which people of African descent could have a philosophy given that
they have been historically characterized as non-rational by western history (Outlaw
1988, 23). Thus, Africana philosophy directly shows how philosophy has been
constructed through the deployment of racialized intellectual frameworks. Second,
Native American philosophers have explored the tensions between the Western
understanding of philosophy and the philosophical traditions of Indigenous peoples
thus revealing how philosophy as a practice has been constructed through means of
violent exclusion. I contend that in taking the aforementioned comparative
contributions seriously we garner a clearer sense on the claim that how Latin
American philosophy understands itself as an appropriate philosophical field hinges
greatly relationships engendered by the colonial problem. As a result, the motivations
for seeking philosophical identity are structured through a quest for recognition.
The goal of this paper is then twofold: (1) To juxtapose Latin American
metaphilosophy and the Africana and Native American tradition in order to
demonstrate the ways in which philosophy as a discipline has been constructed
through exclusionary measures; and in light of such juxtapositions; (2) argue that said
mechanisms of exclusion have themselves motivated and structured how Latin
American philosophy has understood its own quest for philosophical identity. By
drawing out moments of cross-disciplinary convergence, I demonstrate how the Latin
American metaphilosophical debate can be dis-oriented and as a result enriched by
paying closer attention to the motivations that frame its responses. The convergence
with Africana and Native American philosophy puts into focus an explanatory pattern
about the ways in which the process of defining a philosophical tradition is itself a
political task about identity. As a result, we appreciate how the metaphilosophical
debate of Latin American philosophy is informed by a desire for recognition through
Euro-American philosophical standards that fails to account for the intellectual
racialized frameworks of philosophy that always already question the rationality of
non-Europeans.1
1

This paper makes use of terms linked with geography and largely associated with peoples: Latin
American, Western, Native American, Indigenous, Black, African, etc. As such, the use of these terms
is not merely intended to capture location, but rather the connection between people, place, and ideas
about their capabilities to participate in philosophical productions. At stake here is not just the
methodologies, but rather pre-methodological claims about who can participate in philosophical
activity in the first place. Race is a key component of the conversation as it was and continues to be a
determining factor in the valuation of ideas. Hence, when I refer to intellectual frameworks as
racialized, I am specifically calling attention to the fact that the valuation of ideas in philosophy have
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2. THE METAPHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OF
LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
2.1

AN EMPIRICAL, CLARIFICATORY, OR NORMATIVE
INTERPRETATION?

The question “Does there exist a distinct Latin American philosophy?” can be
interpreted as an empirical question, clarificatory, or a normative question. If
understood as empirical, the question seeks to ascertain if there is philosophy in Latin
America. The empirical interpretation requires identification of philosophical thought
in the geographical area that is considered part of Latin America. It is undeniable that
the response to the empirical interpretation is positive, there does exist philosophy in
Latin America. One need only look to the Handbook of Latin American Studies,
which in 1939 initiates a bibliographic section dedicated to Latin American
philosophy. For a more contemporary verification The Blackwell Companion to Latin
American Philosophy neatly details the presence of different philosophical fields in
Latin America. For instance, the essay titled “Phenomenology” by Nythamar de
Oliveira tracks the emergence of phenomenology in Latin America and considers the
future it has for contemporary issues.
At the crux between the interpretative and empirical interpretation of the
metaphilosophical question stands the work of several scholars who have debated
what makes a work Latin American or Latina/o/x. The conversation here focuses on
discerning what term best captures the geographical scope of the region in question.
For instance: Is the term ‘Hispanic’ more appropriate than ‘Latin American’, or is
‘Latin American’ more appropriate than ‘Ibero-American’? According to Susana
Nuccetelli, these set responses can be categorized in two ways: semantically or
pragmatically (Nuccetelli 2013, 3). The semantic problem arises when there is a lack
of semantic criteria that can determine its referent (Nuccetelli 2013, 3). In the case of
the ‘Latin America’, there is concern with determining how broad or narrow the
term’s referent is supposed to be. For example: Does ‘Latin America’ include the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, or Puerto Rico? On the other hand, the pragmatic
problem arises when the use of a particular term is morally, politically, or socially
contestable because of the negative connotations that the term may carry (Nuccetelli
2013, 3). For example: Is the term ‘Latino/a’ appropriate given the fact that it was an
imposed term by the French as a way of advancing national interests with Latin and
Catholic nations (Nuccetelli 2013, 5)? Similar concerns have been raised with respect
to the use ‘Latinx’. Regardless of whether the response is semantic or pragmatic what
these engagements with the metaphilosophical question reveal is an orientation
toward the clarification of ethnic terms for the sake of their most appropriate use.
The normative interpretation of the question attempts to ascertain what is
distinctly Latin American and appropriately philosophical in order to determine the
never been race-neutral, but always already racialized so as to mark the possibilities of the production
of ideas through the negotiations of who counts as both human and rational.
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parameters of what should or should not count as Latin American philosophy. On this
interpretive schema it is necessary to determine what is meant by the term
‘philosophy’ and ‘Latin American’. It is this framework that informs the major
interlocutors in the Latin American metaphilosophical debate: Risieri Frondizi, Jorge
J. E. Gracia, Agusto Salazar Bondy, and Leopoldo Zea. Each theorist provides
normative parameters for determining whether or not Latin American philosophy
exists. The normative interpretation is by and large the most interesting, precisely
because it is normative. However, I think it is important to note that there are a
variety normative issues at stake even in the empirical and clarificatory models of
interpretation. 2 For the sake of this project, I will be focused on the normative
questions raised by Latin American philosophers about what ought to count as
appropriate Latin American philosophy. The focus also makes room for arguments
about what we ought to do to ameliorate its situation. Finally, more contemporary
scholarship on the question of the existence of Latin American philosophy assumes
the normative dimensions of the question by virtue of the fact that their responses fit
squarely within claims of how we ought to understand the tradition.
2.2

NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS: DISTINCTLY LATIN AMERICAN AND
APPROPRIATELY PHILOSOPHICAL

The question “Does a distinct Latin American philosophy exist?” is at its core a
search for philosophical identity and in so doing makes a claim on the status of the
field’s existence. In Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity Jorge J.E.
Gracia created a taxonomy for the positions under the following headings: the
culturalist, the universalist, the critical, and the ethnic positions (Gracia 2008, 133).
The positions are united in their methodological aims, which seek to endorse specific
parameters for determining the existence of a distinct Latin American philosophy.
The culturalist position holds that philosophy, like all other human activities, is
materially situated and therefore, depends on specific cultural factors. All that is
necessary for the culturalist position to hold is the presence of a culture that yields a
philosophy. Therefore, Latin American philosophy will be the result of a Latin
American culture. On this account, Latin American philosophy exists, in so far as a
Latin American culture exists. Furthermore, any philosophy that is not authentically
tied to Latin America, but rather imported or copied from another culture, does not
constitute a genuine philosophy. The culturalist view is heavily informed by the
perspectivist philosophy of Ortega y Gasset, which maintains the importance of
circumstance for understanding the structure of our lived experience. His most
illustrious quote, “Yo so yo y mi circunstancia” or “I am myself and my
circumstance” from Meditaciones del Quijote, indicates the importance that Ortega y
Gasset placed on the circumstances of our lives and their influence on who we are.
2

To do an analysis of all of the normative dimensions of the metaphilosophical conversation is beyond
the reach of this paper. What I do wish to note, however, is that what I am referring to as the normative
is the presumed interpretation of the question that that has gained the most traction and hence the focal
point of the paper.
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Circumstances permeate every facet of our being and influence our views (Gracia
2000, 134). It is for this reason that Jorge J.E. Gracia argues: “A philosophy that
emphasizes the value of the particular and idiosyncratic lends itself quite easily to
supporting the views of culturalist thinkers” (Gracia 2000, 134).
The most notable philosopher that holds the culturalist position is Leopoldo Zea.
In “The Actual Function of Philosophy in Latin America” Zea delineates his
culturalist position by using culture and circumstance as the necessary conditions for
the existence of a genuine Latin American philosophy. He writes: “Latin American
philosophy can exist if there is a Latin American culture from which this philosophy
may take its issues. The existence of Latin American philosophy depends on whether
or not there is a Latin American culture” (Zea 2004, 358). In this essay Zea not only
defends the possibilities of Latin American philosophy, but also stages an argument
for its distinctness from European traditions. For Zea, it is not just that Latin
American philosophy exists, but rather that it exists as distinct from European
philosophy. His position underscores the importance of culture as a distinguishing
feature between Latin America and Europe; a feature that has historically been
described as one of imitation hence not as uniquely or authentically Latin American.
In response, Zea emphasizes the relational histories of Latin America with Europe
through the use of parental metaphors. However, the historical relation to Europe
does not define Latin America, but rather acts as a mechanism that links cultural
theoretical productions without over-determining them. To this effect he writes:
“From Europe we have received our cultural framework, what could be called our
structure: language, religion, customs; in a word, our conception of life and world is
European…We can no more deny that culture than we can deny our parents” (Zea
2004, 364). Of supreme concern for Zea is the development of a response to the claim
that Latin American philosophy is merely an importation or appropriation of
European thought to Latin America. In order to respond to this position, and to
maintain that Latin American philosophy exists, Zea calls for a change in intellectual
perspective. Latin Americans should stop viewing their philosophies as bad copies. A
bad copy does not entail deficiency, but rather difference. Therefore, Latin American
philosophy should not view itself as a deviant bad copy of a master European
philosophy, but merely as a different type of philosophy. He writes:
To be a bad copy does not necessarily mean to be bad, but simply different. Perhaps our
feeling of inferiority has made us consider bad anything that is our own just because it is
not like, or equal, to its model. (Zea, 2004, 366)

Beyond indicating that Latin American philosophy should be understood as different,
and not deviant, from European philosophical models, Zea also provides parameters
for what he takes to be the most important philosophical possibilities that may result
from the Latin American circumstance. Among these possibilities he includes:
working through the European colonial relationship and locating the Latin American
personality by defining its culture. These possibilities are important because they help
develop the philosophical issues of Latin American culture. As he notes: “Another
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task for this possible Latin American philosophy would be to continue to develop the
philosophical issues of that culture, but most especially the issues that European
philosophy regards as universal” (Zea 2004, 364). According to Zea, exploring
abstract philosophical topics such as: being, knowledge, truth, and beauty from a
Latin American circumstance provides the foundation for Latin American philosophy
because of the way in which circumstance and culture permeate human activity.
However, Zea insists that Latin American philosophers cannot view what is Latin
American as an end in itself. Rather, he argues that Latin Americans need to do
philosophy, and this will be sufficient, because their Latin American circumstance
will inform their positions: “Simply by being Latin American, philosophers will
create a Latin American philosophy in spite of their own efforts at depersonalization.
Any attempt to the contrary will be anything but philosophy” (Zea 2004, 368).
Counterposed to the culturalist position is the universalist position. The
universalist view holds that philosophy explores universally applicable concepts. In a
very similar vein to the way in which we understand science as a universally
applicable practice, philosophy is supposed to explore issues that are not
particularized or idiosyncratic, but rather hold across space and time. According to
the universalist, just as it makes little sense to talk about a Chinese science or a U.S.
science, it does not make sense to speak of a Latin American philosophy or a French
philosophy. For the universalist, philosophy, as a discipline, can not acquire peculiar
characteristics that may make it nationally, socially, or ethnically tied to a particular
social group (Gracia 2000, 133). National or geographical descriptive terms used in
philosophy, such as “Latin American” or “German,” are distinctions of a particular
time and place that serve to highlight historical moments but are not considered to be
part of the discipline itself (Gracia 2000, 133). As a result, the universalist position
entails that a peculiarly Latin American philosophy does not exist. Indeed, it could
never exist in so far as this view “sees an intrinsic incompatibility between the nature
of philosophy as a universal discipline of learning and such particular products as
culture. (Gracia 2000, 134)
The most notable figure that maintains the universalist position is Risieri Frondizi.
In “Is there an Ibero-American Philosophy?” Frondizi normatively prescribes the
parameters for philosophy. The normative ascription is presented by contrasting
philosophy to weltanschauung (worldview). He argues that every person has a
weltanschauung, that he describes as “spontaneous philosophy, naïve, quite the
opposite of critical philosophy which is the result of mature and conscious reflection”
(Frondizi 1949, 345). The difference between worldview and philosophy is important
to Frondizi. Philosophy, he maintains, can be contrasted from aesthetic, political, and
social issues, which he argues have been a problematic central focus of philosophy.
Hence, from his argumentative perspective philosophy, in Latin America in
particular, has been subordinated to non-philosophical interests (Frondizi 1949, 346).
The defining focus of philosophy is thus presented in the following fashion: “There
will be philosophy when we reflect in a purely philosophical context, without putting
such activity to the service of political or literary or any other interests and concerns”
(Frondizi 1949, 347). Frondizi’s normative parameters of what is appropriately
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philosophical are further put to the test when he examines the corpus of Latin
American philosophy from what the Handbook of Latin American Studies has
published under their bibliographic section on philosophy. He affirms that a mere ten
percent of what has been published has any claim to philosophical originality
(Frondizi 1949, 347). Furthermore, he argues that most of the work published has
been a mere reconsideration of European philosophical concepts thus making no new
additional original contributions.
As part of his normative prescription for what philosophy ought to be, Frondizi
examines the way in which philosophy has been practiced in Latin America. He
expresses grave concern with the fact that the Latin American philosophical tradition
is rooted in imitative practices of European philosophical thought. Citing the
influence of Ortega y Gasset, which runs central to the culturalist stance, Frondizi
argues that his influence has detrimentally affected the way in which Latin American
philosophy has sought to create itself. On the one hand, he argues that his influence
allowed Latin America to develop its imitative practices by focusing on the
importance of circumstance. However, this fact is not without consequence. The
problem with the concept of circumstance, Frondizi argues, is that it is extremely
ambiguous (Frondizi 1949, 352). Any attempt to ground philosophical positions in
circumstance or perspective will be flawed. Therefore, as he argues with regard to the
efforts of Oretega y Gasset’s followers: “There was in such attempts an error of
perspective. Philosophy is occupied with the ‘totality’ of being as such. And we are ill
able to contemplate this totality with a provincial viewpoint” (Frondizi 1949, 353). In
response, Frondizi maintains that Latin Americans must do philosophy from the
human situation, not from the starting point of a nationally founded situation, such as
an Argentinian perspective. This is the essence of Frondizi’s universalist position. He
maintains that philosophy should be universally applicable. Thus, he positions
himself against the perspectivism that grounds the culturalist stance earlier described
and maintains that there cannot be a Latin American philosophy.
The third position is the critical position. The critical view also holds that Latin
American philosophy has failed to create itself, but for reasons that differ from those
proposed by the universalist stance. The proponents of the critical view argue that
philosophy in Latin America has been subservient to a desire to support the status quo
and for the benefit of elite social groups (Gracia 2000, 135). According to this
position, the condition of Latin American philosophy continues to be haunted by its
colonial history. As a result, Latin American philosophy continues to be
underdeveloped because it continues to be subservient to ideological powers. The
uniqueness of the critical position comes from its use of critique as a starting point. It
diagnoses what is wrong with Latin American philosophy and prescribes a solution
for superseding its current predicament. What Latin American philosophy might look
like beyond its current conditions is left open. Proponents of this position diverge in
their perspectives on the future of the field. For instance, some argue that, once
ideological subservience has been overcome, Latin American philosophy will exist as
a product of a distinct Latin American perspective, hence adopting a culturalist view
with respect to the future (Gracia 2000, 136).
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The most prominent proponent of the critical position is Agusto Salazar Bondy. In
“The Meaning and Problem of Hispanic American Philosophic Thought” Salazar
Bondy traces the history of philosophy in Latin America. He takes the conquest of the
Americas as a historical starting point, thereby excluding the pre-Columbian era as
part of the history of Latin American philosophy. Salazar Bondy argues that his point
of departure is supported by the fact that there is not sufficient data to make the claim
that the Indigenous peoples of the Americas had any philosophy. He notes that what
we know to be Hispanic or Latin America is a community that did not exist in the
Pre-Columbian age. In fact, there was no cultural or social political integration that
could have yielded a community similar to what we term Hispanic America (Salazar
Bondy 2004, 381). Therefore, “the historic community which we customarily call
Hispanic America did not exist before the sixteenth century, and it is only beginning
with this century that we can find cultural products that are definitely philosophical”
(Salazar Bondy 2004, 381).
Given this starting point, Salazar Bondy traces the history of Hispanic philosophy
by citing the presence of scholasticism, positivism, Marxism, and German and French
philosophy. Latin American philosophy, according to Salazar Bondy, is the product
of the importation of foreign doctrines, predominantly from Europe (Salazar Bondy
2004, 387).
To review the process of Hispanic American philosophy is to relate the passing of
Western philosophy through our countries, or to narrate European philosophy in Hispanic
America. It is not to tell the history of a natural philosophy of Hispanic America. (Salazar
Bondy 2004, 388)

In order to demonstrate the predicament of philosophy in Latin America, Salazar
Bondy identifies seven central characteristics of Hispanic American philosophy.The
first is an imitative mode of thought, which in Hispanic American philosophy has
taken the form of adopting preexisting schools of thought and importing them to
Latin America (Salazar Bondy 2004, 388). Thinking is done through theoretical
molds that are shaped and informed by the Western thought (Salazar Bondy 2004,
388). The second characteristic is universal receptivity. Beyond importation and
imitation, Latin American philosophy is plagued by an indiscriminate incorporation
of varying schools of thought, particularly those schools of thought that have gained a
reputation in some European countries (Salazar Bondy 2004, 388). As a result, the
lack of a critical attitude has, according to Salazar Bondy, been taken for a Hispanic
American virtue (Salazar Bondy 2004, 388). Third, Salazar Bondy points to the
absence of any definitive tendency or characteristic as a defining feature of Hispanic
American philosophy. He argues that because we can not find one defining
characteristic of Latin American philosophy “the only alternative is to count as a
distinctive character precisely the absence of definition” (Salazar Bondy 2004, 388).
Consistent with his previous characterizations, the fourth feature he identifies is the
absence of original contributions. Following his claim of universal importation,
Salazar Bondy does not see any original philosophical contributions that could be
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counted as part of a distinct Hispanic American school of thought (Salazar Bondy
2004, 389). The lack of philosophical originality has produced a sense of selfawareness that understands Latin Americans as appropriators of Western thought that
lack originality (Salazar Bondy 2004, 389). The state of affairs generates a deep sense
of intellectual frustration, which Salazar Bondy identifies as the fifth characterization.
The sixth feature that he identifies is the distance between those who practice
philosophy and the community at large. The uncritical importation and receptivity of
ideas has created a distance between ideas and the community they are intended to
reflect. Under ideal conditions, “when an elaborate intellectual creation is genuine, it
reflects the conscience of a community, finding in it profound resonance especially
through its ethical and political derivations” (Salazar Bondy 2004, 389). Hence, the
distance between ideas and reality creates a dissonance between the nonphilosophical community and philosophers revealing the problems with uncritical
importation and receptivity. The seventh, and final feature, dovetails with the sixth.
Salazar Bondy maintains that the schema of uncritical receptivity is one that can be
identified in a plurality of countries throughout Hispanic America (Salazar Bondy
2004, 389). Therefore, in order to better understand why these features, seem to be
applicable in all of these places, it is essential to look at the reality that links all of
them: the culture and history (Salazar Bondy 2004, 389).
The cultural historical reality that unites Latin America is one of dependence on
centers of economic and political power. Although, as Salazar Bondy notes, these
conditions are not unique to Latin America, but are shared by what has been termed
the Third World (Salazar Bondy 395). In order to explain this predicament, Salazar
Bondy looks to the concept of underdevelopment and domination. He notes:
“Underdeveloped countries present an aggregate of basically negative characteristics
which, one way or the other, are related to dependent bonds with other centers of
economic and political power” (Salazar Bondy 2004, 395). Hispanic America has
been constructed in relationship to industrial powers-- Spain, England, or the United
States—that have to a large extent directed the activities of the nations that comprise
Hispanic America according to their own interests (Salazar Bondy 2004, 395).
Ultimately, Salazar Bondy’s diagnosis of Hispanic America and its philosophical
productions are characterized by the presence of a culture of domination, and it is this
culture that has and continues to contribute to the underdevelopment of genuine
Hispanic American philosophy (Salazar Bondy 2004, 395). Yet, not all is lost with
Salazar Bondy’s depiction of the status of Latin American philosophy. In fact, Latin
American philosophy has the possibility of being authentic. Amidst its inauthenticity,
it can become aware of its negative condition in order to recuperate and move past its
predicament. Consequently, the philosophical future envisioned by Salazar Bondy is
filled with possibilities through the destruction of the negative features that stem from
culture of domination (Salazar Bondy 2004, 397). From destruction Hispanic
American philosophy might recuperate itself, become independent of domination, and
strive toward the development of a philosophy that is “both theory and application,
conceived and executed in our own fashion, according to our own standards and
qualities” (Salazar Bondy 2004, 398).
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The fourth and final position of the normative views is the ethnic position. On a
basic level, the ethnic position describes Latin American philosophy as an ethnic
philosophy. According to this view, the necessary condition for Latin American
philosophy will be a Latina/o/x or Latin American ethnos that is held together by
familial historical relations. The most notable figure that holds this position is Jorge
J.E. Gracia, though widely published in a series of sources3, his central claims can be
found Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity.
The ethnic position proposed by Gracia is grounded in the familial historical
understanding of Latina/o/x identity. Gracia describes Latinas/os/x identities as
identities that belong to an ethnos. Ethne are sub groups of human beings that satisfy
the following conditions (Gracia 2008, 17). First, an ethnos is a group of people tied
together by a common ethnicity across generations, which entails that a historical
component that ties it together. Second, ethne are organized as families and break
down into extended families. Third, ethne are united through historical relations that
produce certain characteristics or features that serve to identify members of the ethnic
groups and to distinguish them from other groups (Gracia 2008, 17). Given these
criteria, the category Latina/o/x may be described as an extended historical family
whose members may not have consistent identifiable properties, although the
historical connections that tie them together give rise to a set of characteristics that
may be common to some members of the group and serve to distinguish it from other
social groups (Gracia 2008, 18). Gracia’s view further distinguishes itself from
positions on identity that rely on the consistency of first order properties, or common
essences, like phenotypes or genotypes, to tie individuals (Gracia 2008, 18). Rather,
as Gracia describes it:
Latino and Latino groups are tied by the same kind of thing that ties the members of a
family. We are related, as a mother is to a daughter, and grandparents to grandchildren.
The notion of family does not require genetic ties. (Gracia 2008, 18)

Over time, the relationships forged through different types of social familial
encounters create an ethnic group. In the case of Latina/o/x ethnicity the historical
relations were initiated through the moment of contact between Spain and the
Americas. Hence, the ethnic marker ‘Latina/o/x’ is historical and, given its foundation
in familial like structures of relationships, it does not preclude the possibility of
multiple identities because there are no fixed set of properties that tie the ethnos
together (Gracia, 2008, 22).
According to Gracia’s position, Latin American philosophy exists insofar as the
ethnic term Latina/o/x exists. 4 As the aforementioned culturalist, critical, and
3

For instance: Gracia, Jorge J.E. “Identity and Latin American Philosophy.” Blackwell Companion to
Latin American Philosophy. Ed. Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, Otávio Bueno. Wiley:
Massachusetts, 2007. 253-269
4
It is important to note that for Gracia Latin American philosophy is part of the larger category of
Latina/o philosophy, which ethnically encompasses a larger variety of contexts, experiences, and
historical circumstances.
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universalist positions, Gracia’s view normatively prescribes what should or should
not count as Latin American philosophy. Yet, he departs from the previous positions
by primarily focusing on developing an accurate conception of the ethnic label ‘Latin
American’. He does not pay as much attention to the definition of philosophy per se.
He briefly touches on the subject in Latinos in America where he states: “the aim of
philosophy is to develop a view of the world, or any of its parts, which seeks to be
accurate, consistent, comprehensive, and supported by sound evidence” (Gracia 2008,
188). Moreover, he claims that philosophy can be distinguished from other disciplines
insofar as it is more general, where as other disciplines restrict their research to
particular subjects and methods (Gracia 2008, 189). Second, philosophy is distinct
from other disciplines because its areas of investigation are “uniquely philosophical
such as ethics, logic, and metaphysics” (Gracia 2008, 189). Finally, Gracia maintains
that philosophy is distinct in that it is not merely a descriptive enterprise (Gracia
2008, 189). Rather, philosophy involves interpretation and evaluation (Gracia 2008,
189). For Gracia defining philosophy is not as much of a concern as conceptually
working out what it means to be part of an ethnicity. As a result, he provides a
working sense of the aims of philosophy but does not dedicate as much attention to
defending this definition.
Although Gracia is not as concerned with the definition of philosophy, the ethnic
position does leave room open for the inclusion of texts that would otherwise not be
considered philosophical through the use of dominant standards of philosophy as
exemplified by college curricula and academic journals. The position allows the
inclusion and exclusion of texts through the use of internal and external factors.
Gracia argues:
Membership in an ethnos is contextual and historical, and what counts as something
belonging to the ethnos, such as its philosophy, is not determined exclusively from the
outside; it is negotiated between the outside and the inside, and it is determined for
particular times and places, just as ethnic identity is. (Gracia, 2008, 142)

Hence, the ethnic position by appreciating the negotiation between interior and
exterior factors leaves some room open for Latin American philosophy to arrive at its
own model of what counts as philosophical.
2.3

NORMATIVE MEASURES: ORIENTATIONS AROUND EUROPEAN
THOUGHT

By heeding the call of the metaphilosophical question the positions just described
share methodological concern for normatively prescribing what is distinctly Latin
American and appropriately philosophical. The culturalist and the ethnic position
affirm that Latin American philosophy exists, and the universalist and critical position
deny its possibility. Methodologically, each position arrives at their conclusions by
prescribing the conditions that ought to determine the existence or non-existence of
field. More contemporarily, the New Skeptics as Susana Nuccetelli has termed them,
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have similarly reflected on the conditions of a Latin American philosophical tradition
underscored by a general commitment to the claim that Latin America lacks stable
philosophical traditions and communities of the sort most commonly found in the
major centers of Western philosophy (Nuccetelli 2013, 11).
Furthermore, the taxonomies just described largely exclude the branch of Latin
American philosophy commonly termed philosophy(ies) of liberation, which carries
with it an important critical metaphilosophical dimension and draws on some of the
same figures earlier discussed. The philosophy of liberation defines itself through a
critique of Eurocentrism, philosophical dependency, and inauthenticity (Mendieta
2016). On the metaphilosophical level it offers a critical view of colonized thinking
with an eye toward epistemic ruptures that critique Euro-American views about
philosophy and thus can create more liberatory conditions from which to do
philosophical work. Hence, it is appropriate to describe philosophies of liberation as
counter-philosophical with a heightened degree of self-reflexiveness (Mendieta
2016). Citing the work of Salazar Bondy and Zea, philosophy of liberation
demarcates an important part of history. Zea and Bondy set the stage for the agenda
of philosophy of liberation as they critically engage metaphilosophical concerns
rooted in reflections about what it means to do philosophy from the Americas
(Mendieta 2016). Philosophy(ies) of liberation is subsequently understood as having a
commitment to the idea that all philosophizing is done from an existential situation
and at the service of liberatory praxis for el pueblo or the people. Notably, this branch
of Latin American philosophy takes on a critical starting point but given its
commitment to critique its conversations are internal as it is committed to the
particularities raised by self-awareness.
If a question of this sort has engendered so much discussion, it seems then to pick
at the heart of deeper questions about the identity not just of a philosophical field but
of the people; that is the community it speaks about. In this context, I think gestures
of juxtaposition with other ethnically identified fields prove insightful, as Africana
and Native American philosophy not only have asked similar questions but also
provide different insights into what is at stake in asking a question of this sort. In
other words, the juxtaposition between Latin American philosophy and Africana and
Native American philosophy on this question illuminates the ways in which Latin
American philosophy is participating in a broader pattern of thinking that reveals the
relationship between the rational subject posited by philosophy and the racial colonial
underside that makes the subject of philosophy possible in the first place. I contend
that such efforts of juxtaposition give us further resources to think through the
metaphilosophical concerns of Latin American philosophy more broadly.
The framework used to establish the possibilities of Latin American philosophy
hinges on the role that European thought plays in structuring what counts as
philosophical. The culturalist stance directly attends to a desire for distinction from
Europe grounded in the concept of circumstance. The universalist position reveals
that Latin American philosophy has been purely imitative of European thought, and
more pointedly, the idea of having a nationally bound philosophical tradition is itself
problematic given the nature of philosophy. The critical position directly engages the
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role of European thought to the point of characterizing Latin American philosophy as
purely imitative, but not without recourse to overcoming its situation. However, the
shift away from theoretical underdevelopment will be found after Latin American
philosophy overcomes its situation of dependency generated by colonial domination-a colonial domination that is generated by conditions in relationship to Europe. The
ethnic position although not directly tackling European thought, echoes concerns with
respect to the shared history that links Latina/o/x and Latin American ethnos to a
colonial moment that forms the conditions for the ethnos that is necessary for a Latin
American philosophy.
So, the relationship to European thought stands at the crossroads of identity for
Latin American philosophy. As philosophers of liberation have noted, this crux is a
critical one and extends into concerns with Euro-American philosophy more broadly
(Mendieta 2016). The solutions, however, indicate that Latin American philosophy
has very few options. Latin American philosophy can justify its unique existence by
denying European philosophical influence. It can deny the existence of Latin
American philosophy by making use of European philosophical standards for
justification, or they can attempt to navigate a difficult colonial history by defining
the ethnic term, but not directly tackling the conditions for desiring distinctiveness. It
should then be clear that at stake in this discussion is a concern over the relationship
between Europe and Latin America—a point that philosophers of liberation have
consistently noted, but whose solutions have largely focused on self-critique
(Mendieta 2016). It is for this reason that I suggest a look toward other philosophical
traditions have considered the role of Euro-American thought in the development of
their respective fields. Specifically, Africana philosophy has drawn attention to the
relationship between rationality, race, and the development of philosophical
traditions. Therefore, a comparative look toward Africana philosophy helps to
illuminate the methodological framework that makes the desire for Latin American
philosophy’s recognition a key feature in the debate and further motivates the desire
to for distinctiveness.
3. THE RACIALIZED RATIONAL SUBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY
Metaphilosophical concerns of Africana 5 philosophy find entry into contemporary
Western philosophical debates as a result of arguments advanced by Europeans about
Africans. Specifically, Europeans made claims that certain modes of thought were
5

This article understands Africana philosophy as an umbrella term under which we can situate the
traditions of Africans, as well as, descendants of Africans (Outlaw 1998, 24). It encompasses AfricanAmerican philosophy as well as African philosophy. However, they are not synonymous. The term
African denotes the circumstance(s) of the African continent, whereas the term African-American
denotes a relation to a history of African-descended people and their forced encounters with the
Americas. While there is certainly overlap to be found in arguments and methods amongst these
traditions, it is important to highlight the diversity that comprises Africana philosophy so as to not
homogenize what is a very diverse philosophical tradition given that Africana philosophy is itself
constituted by diversity (Outlaw 1998, 29).
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unique to African people and could thus be regarded as philosophy (Outlaw 1998,
23). However, the context of these discussions were always already structured by the
domination and exploitation of African peoples by Europeans. European colonial
domination and violence was, and in many ways continues to be, rationalized through
the use of strategies that draw on ranking order distinctions of people rooted in racism
(Outlaw 1998, 23). Hence, to many Europeans the claim that Africans could
philosophize was received as nothing short of a bold statement, given that the racist
rationale of colonialism necessarily understood African descended peoples as
subordinate subjects to the “civilized” people of Europe (Outlaw 1998, 23).
In 1945 the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels published La Philosophie
Bantoue, in which he argued that philosophy exists in the Bantu culture of the lower
Congo. Primarily drawing from observations of behavior, customs, and language of
the Luba people (an ethnic group that is part of the Bantu family), Tempels held that
Bantu philosophy can be extrapolated from the lived experience of the Luba (Imbo
1998, 8). The implications of Tempels’ work brought under scrutiny the assumption
of the non-rationality of African people that at its core questioned the concept of the
rational subject posited by enlightenment thinkers. The rational subject was never
intended to include Africans. Consistent with a colonial epistemic lens, rationality
was not an attribute that Africans and their decedents shared with Europeans. Hence,
the metaphilosophical conversations of Africana philosophy have always been
oriented around a criticism of the rational subject the status of humanity and thereby
rationality were concomitantly denied to African descended peoples. Yet, beyond this
critical starting point stands a much larger conversation about how to define or
distinguish the philosophical practices of Africans-- a debate that takes interest in the
question: “Given the global dispersal of African peoples and the subsequent
development of regional (e.g. Caribbean), more or less complex local-national (e.g.
African-American), and nation-state groupings (“Nigerian”, “Kenyan”), can we speak
of “Africana philosophy” in a cogent way?” (Outlaw 1998, 24).
In the context of these conversations, similar to the case of Latin America, the
identity of Africa and its relationship to philosophy are put into question. However,
Africana philosophy is distinctive in its explicit criticism of the western philosophical
rational subject as its starting point. Although the culturalist and critical position as
well as the broader scope of philosophy of liberation take concern with the
implication of philosophical hierloosm from Europe that generate inauthenticity, the
participation in the Western philosophical project by virtue of the status of racialized
intellectual personhood is not at the foreground of discussions. Latin American
philosophy’s metaphilosophical debate has not taken a direct concern with debunking
the myth of the non-rational Latin American. I suspect that this is partially due to the
fact that the Enlightenment thinkers never directly identified people from Latin
America in their work as lacking rationality. Furthermore, the presence of different
colonial legacies makes Latin America’s racial formations distinct. The racial
tensions that exist in Latin America as a result of the presence of different races
(including Black) have fueled different discourses about race, rationality, and the
possibilities of philosophy that is seldom addressed in the metaphilosophical debates
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of Latin American philosophy. Hence, I maintain that the critique of the European
rational subject is extremely important to consider for Latin American philosophy as
it directly and unwaveringly maintains the claim that appropriate philosophical
subjects are racialized and engendered through hierarchies of valuation that stem
from the colonial project.
The question of who counts as Latin American has been and continues to be a
central question of Latin American philosophy. However, the question of racial and
ethnic identity in the case of Latin American philosophy takes on a different form
because of the multiplicity of races and ethnicities present in the region. For instance,
the racial concepts of meztizaje and mulataje have historically played a central role in
the formation of Latin American national identities (Rahier 2003, 42). In some
instances these senses of racial mixing have downplayed the prevalence of racism by
advocating notions of racial harmony while simultaneously marginalizing certain
identities that do not fit the hybridization model (Rahier 2003, 42). Subsequently, the
configuration of national ideologies through the use of tropes like meztizaje, have and
continue to problematically exclude or dismiss Black subjects as either outside of the
nation or completely assimilated in its formation. As a result, Black subjects have
seldom been a direct a concern for Latin American metaphilosophical debates insofar
as the term ‘Latin American’ has never been taken to be racially equivalent with
blackness.
The manner in which the metaphilosophical debate has paid attention to the racial
historical dimensions of what makes intellectual productions appropriately
philosophical suggests that Latin American philosophy continues to grapple with the
colonial ghosts that inform it without considering the way in which its colonial
legacies shape and inform how it understands itself, and how it approaches its
metaphilosophical concerns. However, this is not to discount the scholarly efforts of
liberation philosophy(ies) meta critique about how we produce and reproduce
knowledge, but rather it is to augment the discussion by stretching the internal selfcritique to broader concerns that impact many non-European peoples. Nonrationality, in the history of Western philosophy, has been attributed to Africans
because they were not seen as fully human (Outlaw 1998, 24). Yet, the predicament
of Latin America has never been so straightforward, and here lays the problem.
Regardless of the presence of Europeans in Latin America, its inhabitants will never
carry the badge of being strictly European, no matter how much they desire it. The
racial overtones of the situation entail, that although not all Latin Americans may
identify as Black or even associate their identities with blackness, they are
nevertheless engaged in a racialized framework, whereby their intellectual capacity is
put into question simply because they are non-European and can be associated with
Blackness. In other words, the links with blackness and the historical relationship
between race, rationality, and personhood help to foreground why the distinction
from Euro-America is a concern, and an important concern, in the first place. The
metaphilosophical debate of African philosophy helps to understand the impact of a
colonial-intellectual framework on the possibilities of a philosophical tradition. In
light of these considerations the fact that the Latin American metaphilosophical
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debate is motivated from a position of doubt that requires justification makes more
sense insofar as the relationship between race and assumed intellectual capacity,
although not a central concern, frames the viability of the conversation, thus yielding
doubt over its existence.
Furthermore, the juxtaposition reveals the fact that in asking what is distinct about
Latin American philosophy, we are also inquiring into the possibilities of a
philosophy from a racialized framework where intellectual (rational) capacity is
already at stake. In light of this, the debate’s structure around justification or denial is
understandable insofar as the starting point is not just doubt about a distinct Latin
American philosophy, but doubt over whether the geo-political terrain can even
sustain the possibilities of philosophical thought as dictated by European
philosophical standards. The presumption of doubt that frames the debate brings to
the forefronts the fact that there is more at stake than a definitional project. Rather, it
draws attention to the fact that the rationality of the non-European is always already
in question (Monahan 2005, 17). Hence, the framework underlines the impact of
European thought on the identity of Latin American philosophy. The pressing
concern is how to understand and manage the role of Euro-American thought in the
structuring of the identity of Latin American philosophy.
4. THE INDISPENSABLE AND INADEQUATE:
LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY & EUROPEAN THOUGHT
There is an intimate relationship between European thought and what counts as
philosophical. As the juxtaposition with Africana philosophy demonstrates, what
counts as philosophical is linked to who counts as a rational. However, the solution to
the problem of European thought is not as simple as creating a critical distance from
Europe. Latin American philosophy’s predicament is situated within a framework that
already presumes a problematic relationship to Europe noticeable in its concern with
imitation, lack of authenticity, domination, and dependency. Hence, the conditions of
justification or denial of Latin American philosophy’s existence is set up against the
backdrop of Euro-American thought.
For instance, European thought as Salazar Bondy notes is present in the
philosophy of Latin America. As he traces a history of philosophy, he makes note of
the presence of topics like scholasticism, French philosophy, and Marxism, to name a
few. Moreover, Zea’s general concerns with Latin American philosophy have to do
with finding conditions for authenticity and distinctness from Europe in order to make
the claim that Latin American philosophy is not predicated on imitative practices.
European thought, at this point, is part of the history of Latin American philosophy,
and what Latin American philosophers in this context are reflecting on is the
management of its role in the formation and structure of the tradition in a way that
either preserves or eradicates the traditions possibilities.
European thought is woven into the history of Latin American philosophy. The
problem at hand involves the development of a methodology that appreciates the
presence of European thought without making it a determining feature, and on this
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point the scholarship of Dipesh Chakrabarty proves useful. In Provincializing
Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Chakrabarty discusses the
inheritance of European thought and its impact on the development of scholarship
that works from the margins. He argues that concepts derived from the European
Enlightenment are both unavoidable and indispensable (Chakrabarty 2000, 4). The
concepts of the Enlightenment, of which we are heir to today, have left a mark on our
contemporary understanding of politics (Chakrabarty 2000, 5). They are not mere
conceptual relics of times past. The task, argues Chakrabarty, involves recognizing
that European thought is both indispensable and inadequate for understanding the
contemporary experiences of non-Western nations (Chakrabarty 2000, 16). He
advocates that we “provincialize Europe,” which he takes to mean the task of
exploring how European thought, which is now everyone’s heritage, can be thought
through from the margins (Chakrabarty 2000, 16).
In light of Chakrabarty’s claims I would add that part of the conceptual heirloom
that is derived from the Enlightenment is the way in which we understand philosophy.
Philosophy has been and continues to be defined through European philosophical
norms. This fact is most noted in the earlier reflections garnered from Africana
philosophy with regards to the status of the black subject, rationality, and the
impossibilities of a philosophy. The conclusion that Chakrabarty draws, however,
differs from the strategy that Latin American philosophers have deployed for dealing
with European thought as well as European standards of what makes something
philosophical. Following this line of thought, Latin American philosophy benefits
from these reflections because it does not require that we dispense with European
thought or entirely accept it as part of the traditions’ general identity. After all, the
metaphilosophical debate of Latin American philosophy is at its center a search for
identity. Therefore, European thought must be considered as influential in the
formation of that identity given the history of the tradition and the historical relations
between Latin American and Europe. However, this does not entail that European
thought determine the identity of the tradition. Latin American philosophy can still
remain distinct from European philosophy while recognizing its influence.
The work that remains to be done involves contextualizing European thought
within Latin American philosophy in a manner that sheds light on its impact on the
circumstance of Latin American philosophy. I suggest we view European thought as
indispensable to understanding Latin American philosophy because it has been so
central and present in the formation of the tradition. It is for this very reason that the
metaphilosophical positions are concerned with Europe. However, we should not
forget that European thought remains inadequate for understanding Latin American
philosophy insofar as the tradition entails more than just its relationship to Europe; a
point illuminated by the motivations for engaging in the discussion in the first place.
The sense of inadequacy generated by European philosophical norms for Latin
American philosophy motivates the desire for recognition and authenticity that is so
prevalent in the discussions about the distinctness of the tradition. However, rather
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than fall into the traps of a bind of justification6 I think it is important to consider
what the project of European contextualization does for Latin American philosophy.
In other words, I suggest we consider what it would mean to contextualize Europe
from the framework of the metaphilosophical debate of Latin American philosophy?
5. WHAT DO WE WANT LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TO DO?
By way of solution that can speak to the project of contextualizing Europe, I suggest
that we shift the query structure of the debate. I propose that instead of questioning
whether Latin American philosophy exists we alternatively consider: “What do we
want Latin American philosophy to do?” Part of the larger problem that I see with the
metaphilosophical debate is the way in which its concerns with European
philosophical standards can stifle the development of thought that takes direct
concern with issues that affect Latin Americans and Latinx peoples both in the U.S.
and abroad. In this vein, it is insightful to once again turn toward Africana
philosophy. With respect to Africana philosophy, Tommy J. Curry has notably argued
that to the extent that the field of Africana philosophy continues to define its validity
through its convergence with Euro-American authors the field will become derelict as
it misguides the development of thought that can tackle issues that are relevant to the
lives of Africana people (Curry 2011, 314). He diagnoses Africana philosophy with
having failed to inquire seriously into the culturally specific epistemologies of
African-descended peoples at the service of reading Black thought into the
continuities of the Euro-American tradition (Curry 2011, 317). More pointedly, Curry
takes concern with the fact that what counts as knowledge and subsequently derived
philosophical status must find its grounding in a Euro-American philosophical
tradition. He writes: “Black knowledge is only knowledge insofar as it converges
with a higher anthropological order established in the history of European
philosophy” (Curry 2011, 321). Of great insight from Curry’s reflections is the way in
which Euro-American philosophy functions as the arbiter of the philosophical and
just as importantly the way concerns of other culturally and racially different systems
of thought subsequently made legible only to the extent that they can be framed
through Euro-American philosophical histories (Curry 2011, 321).
Although the histories of Latin American philosophy and Africana philosophy are
different, at times intersecting as a result of colonial histories, the kernel of truth
remains that the epistemic heirloom of Euro-American philosophy will produce
similar patterns of exclusion. It is for this reason that metaphilosophical reflections
are important given that how we define Latin American philosophy will affect how
6

The culture of justification of philosophy has been explored by Kristie Dotson in “How is this Paper
Philosophy?” in which she argues that philosophy manifests a culture of justification whereby
legitimation is privileged according to some presumed commonly held justifying norms, which serve
to amplify existing practices of exceptionalism and sense of incongruence thus making it very difficult
to engender conditions of diversity (6). When I speak of justification in this essay I am referring to the
norms of justification that require legitimation that exceed mere philosophical questioning, and assume
commonly held norms, which are not in fact common and serve only to re-inscribe exclusion.
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way the field gets produced and reproduced. Following, Curry’s critique, it strikes me
that we need a completely new definition of Latin American philosophy that targets
the lived material conditions that generate particular experiences that are distinct to
Latin American and Latinx identities. We need a better definition of what we want
Latin American philosophy to be, which will certainly involve how we handle
European thought, but nevertheless we should focus on philosophically elaborating
conditions that we take to reflect on what it means to be from or tied to Latin
America. The shift can be achieved if we start from the consideration of what we
want Latin American philosophy to be as opposed to the possibilities of its existence.
Here, the starting point takes for granted that Latin American philosophy does exist
and refocuses energy on elaborating its goal and method. The shift from 1) what is
distinct to 2) what we want Latin American philosophy to do enables a conversation
that does not reproduce the dynamics of justification and denial that have
characterized the debate thus far, but rather reorients it in a fashion that can account
for the role that Europe and the U.S. have played in constructing Latin American
philosophy without over-determining. Within Latin American philosophy, liberation
philosophies are the most aligned with concerns that affect the people and emphasize
the way thought must be linked to liberatory praxis. Hence, I am not suggesting that
that the shift toward reflections on the doing of Latin American philosophy are
themselves novel, but rather trying to highlight the ways a look out toward other
fields that have taken similar concerns have set firm ground from which to do the
work of self-critique without necessarily reproducing problematic justificatory
frameworks. Africana philosophy should give us pause to consider who the subject of
Latin American philosophy is and continues to be today, and how even in our
productions of self-critique we might reproduce the very same exclusions we seek to
denounce as Latin American philosophy strives to make itself legible in EuroAmerican philosophical histories.
A further insightful comparative gesture can be drawn from the reflections of
Native American philosophy, which not only holds firm in its existence, but also
takes concern with the possibilities of articulating its positions from within a
philosophical establishment that has been and continues to be hostile to Native people
and their thought. Vine Deloria Jr. opens his essay “Philosophy and the Tribal
Peoples” by discussing the status of academic philosophy by stating:
People of American Indian descent are now seeking admission to one of the most
respected and hallowed intellectual enterprises of Western civilization—philosophy. This
last bastion of white male supremacy does not admit members easily and the roadblocks
ahead are of such magnitude that it is doubtful that very much will be accomplished.
(Deloria Jr. 2004, 3).

Similarly, Marilyn Notah Verney in her essay “On Authenticity” discusses the
challenges that derive from the radically distinct frameworks offered by Native
American philosophy that are at times incommensurable with traditional EuroAmerican philosophical frameworks (Notah Verney 2004, 136). She notes “American
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Indian philosophy is and always has been contrary to much of traditional EuroAmerican philosophy” (Notah Verney 2004, 136). The tension detrimentally impacts
Native people in philosophy because the study of traditional Western philosophy
entails the loss of Native identity. Native philosophy and Native identity are threaded
together whereby what it means to be Native American is bound by the beliefs and
teachings of American Indian philosophy (Notah Verney 2004, 136). Moreover, the
identity of Native people within the Western philosophical establishment is often
understood as located in a time past, a time of primitive people. Indeed, as Deloria Jr.
points out, “the stereotype of primitive people anchors the whole edifice of Western
social thought” (Deloria Jr. 2004, 3). For example, consider the dominant social
contract philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, who articulated the idea of
the formation of a social contract that was preceded by a hypothetical stage wherein
primitive people existed in a state of nature (Deloria Jr. 2004, 3). Ideas about the
progress of civil society remain largely unexamined in philosophy, and “the attitude
of most philosophers is that American Indians represent that stage of human
development in which superstition and ignorance reigned supreme” (Deloria Jr. 2004,
3). Furthermore, the primitive, which is equated with the Indigenous, continues to be
conceived as pre-scientific (Deloria Jr. 2004, 4). Thus, the possibilities of
philosophical exchange between Native American philosophy and Euro-American
philosophy is frail because of the way in which the Western philosophical
establishment has structured itself through the exclusion of what is understood to be
primitive and pre-scientific, and thus associated with Native peoples.
In contrast to Native American philosophy, Latin American philosophy does not
directly regard the Western philosophical framework as incommensurable with a
Latin American philosophical one. Quite to the contrary, Latin American
metaphilosophy tends to operate within the Western philosophical frame by using its
methods, terms, and subjects. Henceforth, a location of critique by some authors who
find Latin American philosophy too bound by European thought (e.g. Salazar Bondy).
So, it is not the case that Latin American philosophy’s methods and understanding of
topics stands in opposition to Western philosophy, at least not within the paradigm of
its metaphilosophical discussion. However, this difference with respect to
metaphilosophical concerns should also be understood as a location from which to
learn more about how the Western philosophical establishment has been structured to
understand other ethnically or racially identified philosophies, and this is an important
contribution of what Latin American philosophy can do. Thinking through Native
American metaphilosophical reflections as an instance of a complex articulation of
exclusion demonstrates that there is a lot to be gained in dialogical juxtapositions,
which reveal new alternatives for understanding what is philosophical. Specifically,
they reveal some of the deep-seated problems of Euro-American philosophy that
impact Latin American philosophy insofar as it too is part of a tradition that is
consistently understood as non-European and non-American.
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6. CONCLUSION
Latin American philosophy has seen dramatic growth in the last decade. From
conferences and publications, to numerous efforts in the name of diversification,
Latin American philosophy, particularly in the United States, has seen tremendous
gains toward efforts of recognition. It is for this reason that serious consideration of
its metaphilosphical debate remains so important. This essay sought to give the a
comprehensive view into the conversation on whether there exists a distinct Latin
American philosophy. In so doing, I have highlighted the ways in which Latin
American philosophy has understood itself through lenses of colonial epistemes that
have constructed standards of what is philosophical through mechanisms of racialized
exclusions. Most importantly, however, I have drawn attention to the ways in which
the mechanisms of exclusion have themselves motivated and structured how Latin
American philosophy has understood its own quest for philosophical identity.
Motivations are seldom clear and juxtaposition to Africana and Native American
philosophy prove invaluable as they illuminate that which cannot be seen from within
the structure of Latin American philosophy’s own conversations. In highlighting the
motivations for recognition of Latin American philosophy’s metaphilosophcial debate
it becomes clear that the heart of the conversation is oriented around the relationship
between Latin American philosophy and its link to Euro-American thought. As such,
I hope to have gestured toward a possibility of thinking through the relationship to
European thought as one that is both inadequate and indispensable to understanding
Latin American philosophical concerns. Instead of asking ourselves whether we think
there is a distinct Latin American philosophical tradition we should re-orient toward
considering a question of praxis: What do we want Latin American philosophy to do?
Ultimately, to do philosophy is a practice, one with its own orientations, and we
would do well by always asking ourselves what we orient ourselves around, what
lines of thought do we make visible and what might we simultaneously erase as we
follow our sense of philosophical grounding?
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